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of sloppy lawyering” by allowing “state law to ‘save’ alimony
arrangements that meet all requirements of � 71(b)(1) except the
explicit statement of termination upon death”. Hoover v.
Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo.
1995-183. Accordingly, while we continue to consult the divorce
documents first in determining a payor spouse’s postdeath
liability for purposes of section 71(b)(1)(D), e.g., Okerson v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 258, 264 (2004), we may now look to
applicable State law if those documents are inconclusive, e.g.,
Gilbert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-92, affd. sub nom.
Hawley v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2004).
The California legislature has not made any changes in the
California family support regime in response to Congress’s 1984
and 1986 amendments to section 71.
B. Continuing Payment Liability With Respect to
Petitioner’s Family Support Obligation
1. Overview
Under this prong of section 71(b)(1)(D), we seek to
determine whether Carmen’s estate could enforce petitioner’s
family support obligation for any period after Carmen’s death.
See, e.g., Preston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-49 n.6, affd.
in part, vacated and remanded in part on another issue 209 F.3d
1281 (11th Cir. 2000); Human v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
106; Sugarman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-410; see also
Geier, “Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law
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