- 17 -
extent permissible under applicable State law principles,12
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent regarding such
postdeath liability. See Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
2; Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474; cf. Estate of
Craft v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 263 (1977) (interpretation of
trust instrument), affd. 608 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).
The majority view in California appears to be that a marital
settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a judgment
is treated no differently from any other written agreement for
purposes of determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
Vance & Pierson, Cal. Civ. Prac. Fam. Law Litig., sec. 8.72 (rev.
Oct. 2004); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Simundza, 18 Cal. Rptr.
3d 377, 380-381 (Ct. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Trearse, 241
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260-261 (Ct. App. 1987); but see In re Marriage
of Benson, 217 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (Ct. App. 1985). Accordingly,
inasmuch as the divorce documents do not address the effect of
Carmen’s death on petitioner’s family support obligation, we may
consider petitioner’s exhibits 5 and 12 (offered to establish his
and Carmen’s alleged understanding that the obligation would
12 Although we apply the rules of evidence applicable in
trials without a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, sec. 7453, it is well recognized that the so-called
“parol evidence rule” (limiting the role of extrinsic evidence of
intent in the interpretation of a written instrument) is a rule
of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence. Estate of
Craft v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 262-263 (1977), affd. 608
F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).
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