Michael K. Berry - Page 17

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          extent permissible under applicable State law principles,12                 
          consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent regarding such           
          postdeath liability.  See Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-           
          2; Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474; cf. Estate of           
          Craft v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 263 (1977) (interpretation of           
          trust instrument), affd. 608 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).                      
               The majority view in California appears to be that a marital           
          settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a judgment             
          is treated no differently from any other written agreement for              
          purposes of determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.            
          Vance & Pierson, Cal. Civ. Prac. Fam. Law Litig., sec. 8.72 (rev.           
          Oct. 2004); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Simundza, 18 Cal. Rptr.            
          3d 377, 380-381 (Ct. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Trearse, 241             
          Cal. Rptr. 257, 260-261 (Ct. App. 1987); but see In re Marriage             
          of Benson, 217 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (Ct. App. 1985).  Accordingly,           
          inasmuch as the divorce documents do not address the effect of              
          Carmen’s death on petitioner’s family support obligation, we may            
          consider petitioner’s exhibits 5 and 12 (offered to establish his           
          and Carmen’s alleged understanding that the obligation would                



               12 Although we apply the rules of evidence applicable in               
          trials without a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District           
          of Columbia, sec. 7453, it is well recognized that the so-called            
          “parol evidence rule” (limiting the role of extrinsic evidence of           
          intent in the interpretation of a written instrument) is a rule             
          of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence.  Estate of               
          Craft v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 262-263 (1977), affd. 608               
          F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).                                                   




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