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Prac. Guide: Fam. Law, sec. 18:40 (2004 ed.).22 It logically
follows that Carmen’s interest in petitioner’s family support
obligation, like the payee spouse’s interest in the premium
obligation at issue in In re Marriage of Benjamins, supra, is in
the nature of spousal support. Her interest in the award would
therefore terminate at her death, leaving her successor without
an enforceable interest.
4. Conclusion
We conclude that petitioner’s family support obligation does
not entail continuing payment liability as contemplated in
section 71(b)(1)(D).
C. Substitute Payment Liability With Respect to
Petitioner’s Family Support Obligation
1. Overview
Under this prong of section 71(b)(1)(D), we look beyond the
issue of continuing enforceability in search of any payment
obligation after Carmen’s death that would, in substance,
represent a continuation (in whole or in part) of petitioner’s
family support payments. See sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-14, Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34456 (Aug. 31, 1984)
(determination of whether payments commencing, increasing, or
accelerating upon the death of the payee spouse are a substitute
22 As discussed infra, the child support component of
petitioner’s family support obligation is more relevant to our
inquiry regarding substitute (as opposed to continuing) payment
liability.
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