- 34 -
paramount, and, if extrinsic evidence of that intent were to
contradict the implications of the general principles discussed
above, the former would control. E.g., Beam v. IRS, 192 F.3d 941,
945 (9th Cir. 1999) (although “specific statutes normally trump
conflicting, general statutes”, appellants’ argument relying on
that general principle “ignores the specifically stated intent of
Congress”). Having said that, we see nothing in the legislative
history of the 1984 Act indicating that, in enacting section
71(b)(1)(D), Congress intended to abandon the specific designation
principle of section 71(c)(1). Any inference to that effect is
particularly unwarranted in light of the fact that Congress
crafted a narrow exception to that principle as part of the same
legislation. See sec. 71(c)(2), supra note 24; cf. Chiles v.
United States, 843 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We cannot
conclude that Congress chose to repeal [I.R.C.] � 2056(c)
expressly and left � 2056(b)(4)(A) intact only to effectuate its
repeal by implication.”).
To be sure, Congress did contemplate that section 71(b)(1)(D)
could, in derogation of the specific designation principle of
section 71(c)(1), render excludable (and therefore nondeductible)
the portion of a payment that, in substance but not in form,
represents child support:
A provision for a substitute payment, such as an
additional amount to be paid as child support after the
death of the payee spouse will prevent a corresponding
amount of the payment to the payee spouse from
qualifying as alimony. * * *
Page: Previous 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011