- 32 -
4. The Case Against the Worst Case Scenario Approach
a. General Principles of Statutory Construction
The worst case scenario approach of Wells v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-2, renders section 71(c)(1) largely superfluous,
in violation of the general premise that “‘a statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)
(quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879)).
Specifically, if the general State law obligation to support one’s
children were the functional equivalent of a substitute payment
obligation in every case (as would obtain if one must assume that
someone other than the payor spouse would take custody of the
children upon the payee spouse’s death), then the only amounts
that section 71(c)(1) could, to the exclusion of section
71(b)(1)(D), render nondeductible would be amounts “fixed” as
child support (taking into account section 71(c)(2)) in excess of
the amount of the general State law obligation.27 Cf. TRW, Inc. v.
26(...continued)
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the doctrine of Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir. 1971), would require us to follow Heller.
27 Presumably, the amount of the State law obligation would
be determined by reference to the child support guidelines
enacted by the State in compliance with Federal law. See 42
U.S.C. sec. 667 (2000); cf. Lawton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1999-243 (rejecting payee spouse’s attempt to identify child
support element of unallocated support payments by reference to
(continued...)
Page: Previous 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011