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(applying section 71(b)(1)(D) to unallocated support ordered by
New Jersey court; inasmuch as Mr. and Ms. Kean shared physical
custody of the children, “there would be no logical reason for the
New Jersey court to order that Mr. Kean continue to pay support or
for the New Jersey court to order any payment as a substitute for
the unallocated support” had Ms. Kean died).
We reach the foregoing conclusion without regard to whether,
as is apparently the case with California child support orders,
see In re Marriage of McCann, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641 (Ct. App.
1994), the controlling order would technically remain in effect
after Carmen’s death until petitioner obtained its (prospective)
judicial termination. Cf. In re Marriage of Trainotti, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1989) (payee under child support order
sought to collect amounts that had accrued during the period
between payor’s assumption of sole physical custody of the child
and the judicial termination of the child support order 10 months
later; trial court “erred by refusing to consider whether
appellant [the payor] had satisfied his obligation by furnishing
Christopher [the minor child], with the approval of his former
wife, a home and support that was equal to or in excess of the
court-ordered amount”);30 Jackson v. Jackson, 124 Cal. Rptr. 101
30 Although the court may have viewed such direct
expenditures as the functional equivalent of payments under the
child support order, neither party suggests that, for purposes of
the substitute payment clause of sec. 71(b)(1)(D), hypothetical
direct expenditures on behalf of children in one’s custody (i.e.,
(continued...)
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