- 35 -
H. Rept. 98-432 (Part 2) at 1496 (1984) (the 1984 House Report).28
That example, however, like section 71(c)(2), represents only a
limited departure from the specific designation principle in that
it relies on other language in the governing instrument. See also
Okerson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 258 (2004) (finding substitute
payment obligation based on provision in the divorce decree
requiring payments for children’s education in the event of payee
spouse’s death); sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-14, Example (1), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., supra (finding substitute payment obligation
based on provision in the divorce decree requiring payments to
children’s trust in the event of payee spouse’s death). Indeed,
the example in the 1984 House Report can be viewed as a corollary
of section 71(c)(2); that is, a provision for additional or
increased child support that is contingent upon the supported
spouse’s death is simply the flip side of a provision for
decreased spousal support that is contingent upon the death or
emancipation of a child.
c. 1986 Amendment of Section 71(b)(1)(D)
Finally, one can draw a negative inference from the 1986
repeal of the requirement that the “termination at death”
28 That example appears to recharacterize alimony as child
support, notwithstanding that the report elsewhere provides that
the “bill attempts to define alimony in a way that would conform
to general notions of what type [sic] of payments constitute
alimony as distinguished from property settlements”. H. Rept.
98-432 (Part 2) at 1495 (1984) (emphasis added); see discussion
supra pp. 9-10, 12-13.
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