Estate of Wayne C. Bongard, Deceased, James A. Bernards, Personal Representative - Page 114

                                        - 97 -                                        
          Majority op. pp. 57-59; fn. ref. omitted.                                   
          The majority opinion’s rationale is factually, logically, and               
          legally flawed.8                                                            
               The majority opinion’s rationale is factually flawed for               
          various reasons.  One reason is that it concludes that decedent             
          could have caused WCB Holdings to redeem the WCB Holdings class B           
          membership units owned by BFLP.  That conclusion is not supported           
          by, and is contrary to, the following findings of fact of the               
          majority opinion regarding the circumstances under which the                
          chief manager of WCB Holdings (chief manager), who was decedent’s           
          son Mark Bongard, was required to obtain the approval of a                  
          majority of the WCB Holdings class A governance units before he             


               8The majority opinion’s reliance on Estate of Thompson v.              
          Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004), affg. T.C. Memo. 2002-           
          246, is misplaced, as is its reliance on certain other cases,               
          principally Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-             
          145, and Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121,             
          in support of its holdings under sec. 2036(a)(1).  Each of those            
          cases found the existence of an agreement under which the                   
          decedent involved retained for life the possession or enjoyment             
          of, or the right to the income from, the property that such                 
          decedent transferred within the meaning of sec. 2036(a)(1).  Each           
          of those cases is materially distinguishable from, and is not               
          controlling in, the instant case.  For example, unlike cases                
          cited by the majority opinion, decedent here did not transfer to            
          BFLP assets needed to maintain his lifestyle; in the instant                
          case, decedent had millions of dollars of assets that remained              
          outside of BFLP (and outside of WCB Holdings) and that were more            
          than adequate to maintain decedent’s lifestyle during his                   
          lifetime.  In addition, in the instant case, during decedent's              
          lifetime there were no distributions to or on behalf of decedent            
          from BFLP and no commingling of BFLP's assets with decedent's               
          assets, as was done in cases on which the majority opinion                  
          relies.                                                                     




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