- 2 -
1. Held: R’s position on income-splitting was
substantially justified; P-W was not prevailing party on
that issue. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i), I.R.C. 1986.
2. Held, further, R’s position on P-W’s civil fraud
penalties was not substantially justified, but R’s
alternative position on P-W’s negligence penalties was
substantially justified; P-W was prevailing party on that
issue to extent of excess of fraud penalties over negligence
penalties. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(A), I.R.C. 1986.
3. Held, further, Under the circumstances of the
instant case, Ps’ motion to reopen the record did not
unreasonably protract the proceedings. Sec. 7430(b)(3),
I.R.C. 1986.
4. Held, further, Amounts of costs apportioned,
generally in accordance with ratio of (a) excess of P-W’s
determined fraud penalties over P-W’s determined negligence
penalties, to (b) other determined amounts.
5. Held, further, Ps’ settlement offer was not a
“qualified offer” because it failed statutory designation
requirement. Sec. 7430(g)(1)(C), I.R.C. 1986.
John S. Ponseti, for petitioners.
Susan S. Canavello, for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHABOT, Judge: This matter is before us on the motion of
petitioner Sandra M. Downing1 (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as Sandra) for an award of reasonable litigation and
1 Petitioner Michael J. Downing (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as Michael) is not a party to this motion, but he
nevertheless remains a party in the case. See DeLucia v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 804, 811 (1986).
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011