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of the "qualified offer" definition are conjunctive.
Petitioners' settlement offer fails to meet the subparagraph (C)
requirement, and so it is not a qualified offer.
We hold for respondent on this issue.11
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be
issued granting petitioner’s motion
to the extent indicated herein and
denying petitioner’s motion in all
other respects.
10(...continued)
might fairly qualify as a designation required by the statute.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in another
Internal Revenue Code setting, “Congress has drafted the statute,
and we are not free to rewrite it.” Hildebrand v. Commissioner,
683 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1982), affg. T.C. Memo. 1980-532.
11 Under these circumstances, we do not consider
respondent’s additional contention that the settlement offer does
not qualify under sec. 7430(g)(1)(B) because it “does not specify
what portion of the offered amount, if any, pertains to
[Sandra’s] liability as distinguished from that of” Michael.
Respondent has not contended, and so we do not consider, whether
sec. 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) (supra note 4 relating to requirement that
liability determined pursuant to the judgment be equal to or less
than liability under the offer) precludes Sandra from “qualified
offer” relief because the $5,750 offered amount is less than the
finally redetermined liabilities of Sandra and Michael combined.
Also, we do not consider whether sec. 7430(c)(4)(E)(iv) (supra
note 4 relating to coordination) precludes Sandra from “qualified
offer” relief because of the limited relief we have granted to
Sandra with regard to part of the civil fraud penalties.
Finally, it is not necessary to determine how much of the claimed
costs were incurred after Jan. 18, 1999. See supra note 4 last
paragraph.
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