William A. Egan - Page 10

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          wished to deduct the bad debt in 1998, petitioner should have               
          taken measures to preserve the requisite records, even though the           
          sales to which the alleged debt related were in 1994.                       
               Accordingly, we find that petitioner has not introduced                
          evidence to substantiate the deduction, and therefore, petitioner           
          may not deduct any amount with respect to the bad debt allegedly            
          owed him by Brooks Foods.6                                                  
          III.  Year of Worthlessness                                                 
               We next address petitioner’s argument that it is irrelevant            
          which year petitioner claimed the deduction because it would have           
          created a net operating loss that petitioner could have carried             
          forward or backward under section 172.  See sec. 172(b)(1)(A).              
          Petitioner’s position is contrary to established law.                       
               The bad debt deduction is available only for those debts               
          that become worthless during the taxable year.  Sec. 166(a)(1).             
          Moreover, petitioner must prove that the debt had value at the              
          beginning of the year and that it became worthless during that              

               6Petitioner also failed to prove that the debt was bona                
          fide.  See sec. 166(a)(1).  Petitioner did not show that a valid,           
          enforceable obligation was created to pay a fixed or determinable           
          sum of money.  See sec. 1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs.  In                    
          addition, petitioner did not show whether interest was charged,             
          whether Egan Oil recorded the amount allegedly owed as a debt on            
          its books, whether any payments were made on the debt, or whether           
          Egan Oil had any collateral other than the note or the alleged              
          life insurance policy.  We have no proof of these facts other               
          than petitioner’s own testimony that a petroleum purchase                   
          transaction took place between Brooks Foods and Egan Oil.  The              
          notes Mr. Hauser made to guarantee payment, simply a formal                 
          indication that a debt was owed, are not sufficient to establish            
          that a bona fide debt existed.  See Sundby v. Commissioner, T.C.            
          Memo. 2003-204; Hotel Cont’l., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.             
          1995-364, affd. without published opinion 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.           
          1997).                                                                      




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