FPL Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries - Page 101

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            Because the system constitutes separate property, respondent                                
            argues that petitioner failed to incur or commit $1 million or 5                            
            percent of costs as of December 31, 1985, and failed to begin                               
            construction as of that date.                                                               
                  Petitioner relies on Steelcase, Inc. v. United States, 76                             
            AFTR 2d 5185, 95-2 USTC par. 50,336 (W.D. Mich. 1995), to support                           
            its argument that “The redesign of ‘property’ during construction                           
            simply does not create separate ‘property’ as Respondent                                    
            suggests.”  We find that the building in Steelcase is                                       
            distinguishable from petitioner’s instrument air upgrade.  The                              
            taxpayer in Steelcase redesigned its building after construction                            
            had begun and before the completion of the building, while                                  
            petitioner placed the instrument air system in service in St.                               
            Lucie Units 1 and 2 when they became operational, and then                                  
            redesigned the system several years later.  The rationale of                                
            Steelcase, which found that property could qualify as self-                                 
            constructed property when a taxpayer made design modifications                              
            during construction, does not allow taxpayers to redesign                                   
            property after the transition date when it has placed the                                   
            facility in service and then decides to reconstruct the component                           
            at a later date.  Because St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were placed in                            
            service and operated before the installation of the instrument                              
            air upgrade, we think that the components at issue constitute                               
            separate property.  Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,                           





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