-20-
required him to refer petitioner’s case to CID in face of that
unanswered question. See id.; see also United States v. Peters,
supra at 455; United States v. Caldwell, supra at 1402-1403;
Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir. 1983).
As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. McKee, 192 F.3d at 544, courts must defer to the
discretion of a civil agent as to whether and when a criminal
investigation is warranted. See also United States v. Caldwell,
supra at 1402; cf. United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-
499 (4th Cir. 1988).
Nor do we believe that a violation of IRM section 4565.21(1)
occurred when Cox spoke to Voorhees just before Cox’s criminal
referral of petitioner. While petitioners invite the Court to
read IRM section 4565.21(1) narrowly to treat any prereferral
contact between the two as a violation of IRM section 4565.21(1),
we decline that invitation and apply that section as written to
preclude “advice and/or direction from CI for a specific case
under examination.” Credible evidence in the record establishes,
and we find as a fact, that Cox’s conversation with Voorhees did
not involve advice and/or direction from Voorhees as to Cox’s
criminal referral of petitioner. The conversation focused solely
on whether CID would accept Cox’s criminal referral of petitioner
if Cox expended the time and energy to make a referral on the
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