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allocation under section 6015(c) further demonstrates the
unreasonableness of his position.
The fourth flaw in respondent’s position stems from his
failure to make a computation under section 6015(c) and (d) to
reflect his contention that the Owens’ partnership interest in
DGE was jointly owned. Had respondent done so, the resulting
calculation would have shown substantially reduced tax
liabilities owed by petitioner after application of section
6015(c) and (d) and would have confirmed that petitioner
qualified for section 6015(c) relief.12 If respondent had then
conceded that petitioner was entitled to section 6015(c) relief
in the notice of determination or in his answer, the concession
might have enabled the parties to settle this case at a much
earlier date.13
12Although respondent’s calculation would not have arrived
at the same tax liability numbers as those reflected in the
settlement because of respondent’s interpretation of sec.
6015(d)(3)(B), see Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 73 (2003),
the computation would nevertheless have confirmed that petitioner
was entitled to sec. 6015(c) relief. When our opinion in Hopkins
v. Commissioner, supra, rejecting respondent’s interpretation of
sec. 6015(d)(3)(B), was filed on July 29, 2003, respondent had
reason to know that the application of the tax benefit rule of
sec. 6015(d)(3)(B) might increase the relief available to
petitioner under sec. 6015(c). If respondent had revised his
calculation at that time (approximately 5 months after his answer
was filed), he would have arrived at the same tax liabilities as
those reflected in the settlement.
13The fact that respondent eventually conceded that
petitioner was entitled to proportionate relief under sec.
6015(c) is a factor we may consider, although it is not
(continued...)
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