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attorneys in the trial of the test cases did not constitute a
structural defect in the trial but rather resulted in harmless
error. See Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-101 (Dixon
III). However, the Court imposed sanctions against respondent,
holding that Kersting program participants who had not had final
decisions entered in their cases would be relieved of liability
for (1) the interest component of the addition to tax for
negligence under former section 6653(a), and (2) the incremental
interest attributable to the increased rate prescribed in former
section 6621(c).
After the issuance of Dixon III, the remaining test case
petitioners, all of whom were still represented by Izen, and some
of the participating nontest case petitioners filed motions for
attorney’s fees and costs (the initial fee requests), relying
primarily on sections 7430 and 6673. The Court ordered the
movants to submit documentation pertaining to fees and expenses
incurred commencing June 10, 1992 (i.e., the day after the Court
learned of the misconduct by the Government attorneys). In Dixon
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-116 (Dixon IV), the Court
rejected the initial fee requests insofar as they relied on
section 7430, on the ground that the movants had not
substantially prevailed on the merits as required by section
7430(c)(4)(A)(i). However, the Court awarded a portion of the
claimed fees and expenses under section 6673(a)(2)(B) (relating
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