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brief. We find that the affidavit attached to petitioner’s
opening brief satisfies Rule 232(d).
2. Respondent’s Challenge to Petitioner’s Claim for
Attorney’s Fees Above the Statutory Limit
Respondent challenges the hourly amount petitioner claims
for attorney’s fees since that rate exceeds the statutory
maximum. Respondent argues that petitioner has failed to show
the existence of a special factor, such as one of those set forth
in section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii), to justify a higher rate.
Petitioner counters by arguing that a higher hourly rate is
justified in this case because: (1) Its counsel has an LL.M. in
taxation and is a board-certified Federal tax attorney; (2) its
counsel is one of three board-certified attorneys in El Paso,
Texas; (3) its counsel possessed special skills necessary to
litigate a worker classification dispute; and (4) its counsel’s
special skills caused respondent to concede the ultimate issue.
We agree with respondent.
Petitioner’s argument that its counsel has an LL.M. in
taxation and State certification as a tax law specialist does
not, by itself, satisfy the special factor requirement. Section
7430 provides the mechanism for taxpayers to recover
administrative and litigation costs. See Cassuto v.
Commissioner, supra at 742. Congress could not have intended all
attorneys with tax lawyering skills to recover amounts greater
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