-11-
Petitioners also argue that Rev. Proc. 99-17, supra, is
invalid because section 475(g) restricts the Commissioner’s
ability to prescribe the time and manner of the mark-to-market
election only by regulation, not by issuing procedures. We
disagree. We have previously considered the validity of Rev.
Proc. 99-17, supra, and concluded that the Commissioner issued it
under the Secretary’s general authority to prescribe the time and
manner of the mark-to-market election. Lehrer v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2005-167. We also noted in Lehrer that the taxpayers’
election was so late that even without looking to Rev. Proc. 99-
17, supra, for guidance, we would still have concluded that the
taxpayers were not entitled to change their method of accounting.
Id. (citing Pac. Natl. Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194-195
(1938), and Wierschem v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 718, 722-724
(1984)).
We conclude, as we did in Lehrer, that Rev. Proc. 99-17,
supra, was validly issued under the Secretary’s authority to
prescribe the time and manner of the election. Lehrer v.
Commissioner, supra. Moreover, petitioners’ and SPK’s attempted
elections were nearly 18 months late. We find, as in Lehrer,
that these attempted elections were too late to allow petitioners
and SPK to change their accounting method even absent the
guidance of Rev. Proc. 99-17, supra.
Availability of Section 9100 Relief
Petitioners argue that, even if they and SPK did not make
effective mark-to-market elections under the revenue procedure,
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