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reference and reproduce as the appendix, we concluded that “the
reasoning of Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., [496 U.S. 384
(1990),] precludes us from awarding appellate fees and expenses
under section 6673.” We resolved instead to “treat the present
movants as having revived their section 7430 claims” (i.e., those
raised in the wake of Dixon III and rejected by the Court in
Dixon IV on “prevailing party” grounds).10 With a nod to the
Youngs’ previous objection to the Binder/Minns fee requests, we
ordered the submission of net worth affidavits for all real
parties in interest with respect to the Izen fee request and the
Jones fee request. See Rule 231(b)(4); see also infra Part I.A.
Specifically, we requested the affidavits of “those individuals
who have made payments of the requested appellate fees and
expenses to Mr. Izen--directly or through contributions to the
Atlas Legal Defense Fund--or Mr. Jones or are otherwise liable
for any portion of the requested appellate fees and expenses”.11
On May 10, 2006, we issued our opinion in Dixon v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97 (Dixon VII), awarding, under
section 7430, $248,049.27 in respect of the PH appellants’ fee
request and $158,562.50 in respect of the Hongsermeiers’ fee
10 Consistent with that approach, on Nov. 2, 2005, we
ordered that all future filings pertaining to the Izen fee
request be filed on behalf of the Adairs as well as the Youngs.
11 We had issued a similar order pertaining to the
Binder/Minns fee requests on Sept. 1, 2005. See Dixon v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97 App. A.
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