Hoyt W. and Barbara D. Young, et al. - Page 21

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               Under section 6673(a)(2), we are authorized to sanction                
               respondent for the attorney misconduct that marred the                 
               test case trial by charging him the full amount of                     
               petitioners’ attorney’s fees relating to the Tax Court                 
               proceedings necessitated by that misconduct, subject                   
               only to the requirement that such amounts have been                    
               reasonably incurred.  Because that misconduct did not                  
               extend to the appellate proceedings, petitioners are                   
               relegated to the applicable fee-shifting provision--                   
               section 7430, with its hourly rate cap and eligibility                 
               requirements--with regard to their appellate fee                       
               requests.  [Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97                  
               at Part I.C.; citation and fn. refs. omitted.]                         
          Those observations apply equally here.                                      
                    2.   Real Parties in Interest                                     
               We also indicated in our September 8 order that we would               
          look to the real parties in interest with respect to petitioners’           
          fee requests in applying the net worth requirement of section               
          7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).  We first adopted that approach in an order              
          pertaining to the Binder/Minns fee requests that we had issued 1            
          week earlier.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  In Dixon           
          VII, we amplified our thinking in that regard:                              
               The case for looking beyond the named parties is                       
               particularly compelling in these proceedings, where                    
               similarly situated taxpayers not only shared the costs                 
               of the litigation but also “had rights at stake in the                 
               case on the merits”.  Sisk, * * * [“The Essentials of                  
               the Equal Access to Justice Act:  Court Awards of                      
               Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct                    
               (Part One),” 55 La. L. Rev. 217 (1994)] at 346 (arguing                
               that one can be a real party in interest with respect                  

          ensure that their requests for fees on appeal before this Court             
          are procedurally postured with the Youngs’ Motion”.  We summarily           
          denied the PH appellants’ motion “For the reasons discussed in              
          our Order dated September 8, 2005”.                                         

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