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Under section 6673(a)(2), we are authorized to sanction
respondent for the attorney misconduct that marred the
test case trial by charging him the full amount of
petitioners’ attorney’s fees relating to the Tax Court
proceedings necessitated by that misconduct, subject
only to the requirement that such amounts have been
reasonably incurred. Because that misconduct did not
extend to the appellate proceedings, petitioners are
relegated to the applicable fee-shifting provision--
section 7430, with its hourly rate cap and eligibility
requirements--with regard to their appellate fee
requests. [Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97
at Part I.C.; citation and fn. refs. omitted.]
Those observations apply equally here.
2. Real Parties in Interest
We also indicated in our September 8 order that we would
look to the real parties in interest with respect to petitioners’
fee requests in applying the net worth requirement of section
7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). We first adopted that approach in an order
pertaining to the Binder/Minns fee requests that we had issued 1
week earlier. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In Dixon
VII, we amplified our thinking in that regard:
The case for looking beyond the named parties is
particularly compelling in these proceedings, where
similarly situated taxpayers not only shared the costs
of the litigation but also “had rights at stake in the
case on the merits”. Sisk, * * * [“The Essentials of
the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct
(Part One),” 55 La. L. Rev. 217 (1994)] at 346 (arguing
that one can be a real party in interest with respect
16(...continued)
ensure that their requests for fees on appeal before this Court
are procedurally postured with the Youngs’ Motion”. We summarily
denied the PH appellants’ motion “For the reasons discussed in
our Order dated September 8, 2005”.
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