- 26 -
7430(a)(2), (c)(1)(B)(iii); see Frisch v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
838, 844 (1986) (distinguishing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976 (CRAFAA), 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 (2000), under
which a court “may allow the prevailing party * * * a reasonable
attorney’s fee”); cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96
(1989) (fee award under CRAFAA is not limited to the amount the
prevailing party owes his attorney pursuant to contingent fee
agreement). For purposes of section 7430, fees are “incurred”
when there is a legal obligation to pay them. E.g., Grigoraci v.
Commissioner, 122 T.C. 272, 277-278 (2004).
In his opposition to the Izen fee request, respondent,
referring to the $373,400.71 of fees and other expenses initially
requested, asserts that “there is no showing that the Youngs have
paid (or were obligated to pay) this or any other amount.”
Respondent raised a similar argument with regard to the
Binder/Minns fee requests. As we stated in Dixon VII: “Under
the ‘real party in interest’ approach * * *, the fact that
petitioners have not, by and large, paid or incurred the claimed
fees and expenses does not render those amounts unrecoverable
under section 7430.” Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97
at Part II.B.2. Rather, “the relevant inquiry is * * * whether
the real parties in interest who did pay or incur those amounts
satisfy the net worth requirement imposed by section
18(...continued)
pro bono services.
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