Benjamin O. & Linda L. Agbaniyaka - Page 11
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property”, as defined in section 280F(d)(4), a taxpayer must
satisfy substantiation requirements set forth in section 274(d)
before such expenses will be allowed as deductions. See sec.
1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016
(Nov. 6, 1985). “Listed property” is defined in section
280F(d)(4) to include passenger automobiles and other property
used as a means of transportation, unless excepted by section
280F(d)(4)(C) or (5)(B). See sec. 280F(d)(4)(A)(i) and (ii).
Evaluation of Evidence on Which Petitioners Rely
Petitioners rely on their own testimony in order to satisfy
their burden of proof in this case. We found Mr. Agbaniyaka’s
testimony to be general, vague, conclusory, uncorroborated, self-
serving, and/or questionable in certain material respects. We
found Ms. Agbaniyaka’s testimony to be general, conclusory, and
self-serving in all material respects.7 Under these circum-
stances, we are not required to, and we shall not, rely on Mr.
Agbaniyaka’s testimony and Ms. Agbaniyaka’s testimony to estab-
lish petitioners’ position with respect to any of the issues
presented in this case. See Lerch v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 624,
631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger v.
Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per
curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159; Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183,
7The only testimony that Ms. Agbaniyaka gave in support of
petitioners’ position on the issues presented was that her
husband’s testimony is correct.
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Last modified: November 10, 2007