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(3) petitioner’s former spouse did not include the family support
payments in her income (the inclusion argument).
Respondent’s designation argument is easily dismissed.
A careful reading of the statute clearly demonstrates that the
definition of “alimony” does not include a requirement that the
divorce or separation instrument “designate” the payment as
includable in the gross income of the payee spouse and allowable
as a deduction to the payor spouse.2
Respondent’s termination argument proceeds upon the premise
that petitioner’s obligation to make the family support payments
would continue after the death of his former spouse. In support
of this argument, respondent in his brief cites numerous
previously decided cases regarding whether the taxpayer’s
obligation to make family support payments under State law
2 If a payment is to be treated as alimony for purposes of
sec. 215, then, in addition to the other requirements noted
above, the divorce or separate maintenance instrument must not
designate that the payment is not includable in the income of the
recipient spouse and not allowable as a deduction to the payor
spouse. Sec. 71(b)(1)(B). Respondent’s designation argument, in
effect, converts the requirement that certain conditions not be
included in a divorce or separation instrument into a requirement
that certain conditions be included. We are aware of no
principle of statutory construction or logic (at least from an
Aristotelian standpoint) that would allow such a conversion.
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Last modified: May 25, 2011