- 7 - (California and others) terminated upon the death of the payee spouse.3 We see little point in a detailed discussion of those cases, as their holdings present no clear direction as to how this case should be resolved. As in the prior cases, neither party has called the Court’s attention to California law, whether statutory or otherwise, that determinatively resolves the question.4 3 For example, respondent cites Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-258, in which the Court held that it would presume that the obligation to make the marital payments could have survived the remarriage or death of the payee spouse and that sec. 71(b)(1)(D) was not satisfied because there was insufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that these payments would not have survived the death of the payee spouse before the children in her custody reached the age of majority. Respondent cites Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-273, affd. sub nom. Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002), in which the Court found that the parties intended the payments to terminate not upon the death of the payee spouse, but rather upon the happening of one or more specified events pertaining to their children and, consequently, held that the payor spouse’s payments failed to meet the sec. 71(b)(1)(D) requirement. Respondent cites cases applying Colorado law, Miller v. Commissioner, supra, New Jersey law, Gonzales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-332, and Pennsylvania law, Gilbert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-92, affd. sub nom. Hawley v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2004), for the proposition that payments of unallocated family support do not satisfy the sec. 71(b)(1)(D) requirement and thus do not qualify as deductible alimony. 4 California law, of course, would control here. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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