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petitioners instituted and have maintained the proceedings in
those cases primarily for delay. We further believe that, in
support of that goal, in each case, they raised frivolous
arguments and relied on groundless positions. We have on more
than one occasion during these proceedings stated our concern
that petitioners had raised meritless arguments that served
merely to delay the collection of tax. We accorded petitioners
both a hearing and the opportunity to respond in writing to our
concerns. Neither by petitioner Robert E. Gillespie’s
declaration nor by petitioners’ written responses to our orders
to show cause have petitioners shown us the merit of any
averment, claim, or argument advanced by them.2 In our orders
2 Unsupported by any citation of authority, petitioners
claim that the standard for imposition of a penalty under sec.
6673(a)(1) is bad faith. In Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
285, 294 n.2 (2002), we observed:
There is some question whether it is necessary for
a court to find that a taxpayer acted in bad faith in
order to impose a penalty on him under sec.
6673(a)(1)(B) for putting forth a frivolous or
groundless position. Compare Branch v. I.R.S., 846
F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir. 1988) (“A taxpayer’s asserted
good faith is not relevant to the assessment of
frivolous return [sec. 6702] penalties.”) with May v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1306 (8th Cir. 1985)
(“showing of willfulness, or lack of good faith, is
required [for sec. 6673(a)(1) damages]”).
We have not, however, required a showing of bad faith before
imposing a sec. 6673(a)(1)(B) penalty, see, e.g., Bean v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-88; Holmes v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2006-80; Wetzel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-211, and
do not believe that to be a requirement of the statute.
(continued...)
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