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3. Unreasonable and Vexatious Conduct
The purpose of section 6673(a)(2) is to penalize an attorney
for his misconduct in unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying
the proceedings. Congress has not, however, specified the degree
of culpability that an attorney must exhibit before we may
conclude that his conduct in multiplying the proceedings is
unreasonable and vexatious. See, e.g., Takaba v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. at 296-298. The language of section 6673(a)(2) is
substantially identical to that of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927 (the two
provisions serving the same purpose in different forums), and we
have relied on caselaw under the latter to ascertain the degree
of culpability necessary to make an award under the former.
Takaba v. Commissioner, supra at 296-297. While most of the
United States Courts of Appeals have required a showing of bad
faith before awarding costs under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927, a few have
required only a showing of recklessness, a lesser degree of
culpability. Id. at 297. Among those few is the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The
venue for appeal of any award of costs imposed on Mr. Jones may
be the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
See sec. 7482(b)(1) (second sentence); Takaba v. Commissioner,
supra. If not, it may be the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. See sec. 7482(b)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the
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Last modified: November 10, 2007