- 22 - similarly, stating that revenue rulings are entitled to limited deference. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998); First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1998); see also U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing the level of deference owed to agency interpretations after United States v. Mead Corp., supra), revg. 113 T.C. 329 (1999). The Commissioner also recognizes the limited strength of a revenue ruling, explaining in his procedural rules that “The conclusions expressed in Revenue Rulings will be directly responsive to and limited in scope by the pivotal facts stated in the revenue ruling”, sec. 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a), Statement of Procedural Rules, and “Revenue Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations”, sec. 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d), Statement of Procedural Rules. In United States v. Mead Corp., supra, the Supreme Court considered the degree of judicial deference afforded to a ruling by the U.S. Customs Service as to a tariff classification. The Court stated: “We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the ruling is eligible to claim respectPage: Previous 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 NextLast modified: March 27, 2008