- 17 -
See, e.g., sec. 265(b)(3)(E). Congress, however, did not in
those statutes provide any aggregation or indirect ownership rule
that would apply to the numerator. Instead, Congress referred
simply to the obligations of the “taxpayer” for purposes of
making that calculation. “‘[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.’” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
(quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th
Cir. 1972)).
Respondent argues that not reading the relevant text as
providing for Peoples’ indirect ownership of the subject
tax-exempt obligations leads to an “absurd” result. We disagree.
As discussed above, Congress apparently did not specifically
intend through the applicable statutes to address the gap left
open in the setting at hand. We apply the law as written by
Congress and leave it to Congress or to the Department of the
Treasury, the latter through and to the extent of its regulatory
authority or by other permissible means, to address any gaps in
the statutes as written. See Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S.
526, 538 (2004). To be sure, agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service have a great amount of authority to issue
regulations to fill gaps in a statute. See, e.g., Chevron
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