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Secretary’s regulations. Moreover, the principal opinion appears
to uphold the regulations. It cites section 1.2-2(c)(1), Income
Tax Regs., and claims: “We * * * consider whether it is
reasonable to assume that petitioner, who was temporarily absent
from her home in 2002 due to her arrest and jail confinement but
before her conviction, would return to her home.” Principal op.
p. 9. It characterizes Hein v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 826 (1957),
as having “previously established factors to rely on in making
this determination.” Id. It claims to “apply the factors we set
forth in Hein to the circumstances here and concludes that it was
reasonable to assume petitioner would return to her home with her
children.” Id. at 10. It declines, however, “to assess
objectively the strength of the criminal charges against
petitioner or require petitioner to show the weakness of the
charges against her to determine whether it was reasonable to
assume she would return to her home.” Id. Besides the pendency
of the criminal case against petitioner at the end of 2002, and
petitioner’s reference to her mother-in-law’s home as her “home”,
the only factor the principal opinion mentions is: “As in Hein,
there are no indications in the record that petitioner intended
to choose a new home.” Id. It concludes: “[A]lthough
petitioner has been arrested and was confined in jail through the
end of 2002, it was reasonable to assume she would return to her
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