- 37 -
mean acceptance and approval of any or all of the reasons
assigned by the Court for its conclusions.” 1958-2 C.B. at 3.
Third, Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra, is distinguishable in that it
is interpreting a regulation, sec. 1.152-1(b), Income Tax Regs.,
that does not contain the reasonable-expectation-of-return test,
contained in section 1.2-2(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. See supra
note 3. Perhaps Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra, is best read as
acknowledging that nursing home stays are “temporary absences due
to special circumstances” if done with the intent or hope of one
day returning, rather than abrogating a different regulation’s
requirement that such a hope to return be reasonable. The ruling
is also distinguishable in that a nursing home stay, although it
may be necessitous, is not compelling in the same way that a stay
in jail is compelling.
Fourth, even if not distinguishable, Revenue Rulings do not
have the force of regulations. E.g., Estate of Kincaid v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 25 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held: “[T]he Commissioner’s acquiescence in an erroneous
decision, published as a ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the
United States from collecting a tax otherwise lawfully due.”
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965).
Finally, and most importantly, are we really prepared to
interpret a ruling that, it seems by stealth, overrules a
Page: Previous 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011