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it should explain how it is consistent with Hein, which I read as
disregarding a multiple factor analysis in favor of establishing
the lack of evidence of intent to change the place of abode as
the sole deciding factor.
The Commissioner’s acquiescence in Hein, to say the least,
muddies the waters.
G. Rauenhorst v. Commissioner
In Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (2002), we
refused “to allow * * * [IRS] counsel to argue the legal
principles of * * * opinions against the principles and public
guidance articulated in the Commissioner's currently outstanding
revenue rulings.” Id. at 170-171. The concurring opinions
would, explicitly, in the case of Judge Gale, and, implicitly, in
the case of Judge Goeke, invoke Rauenhorst to foreclose
respondent from disavowing his acquiescence in Hein v.
Commissioner, supra, and his ruling, Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra.
First, I must point out the respondent has disavowed
neither. This is a fully stipulated case, the parties did not
file briefs, there was no argument, and respondent’s position in
his trial memorandum disavowed nothing.
Second, because of the boilerplate accompanying his
acquiescence, respondent’s acquiescence in Hein is ambiguous as
to what, exactly, he is acquiescing, other than the conclusion
reached: The Commissioner’s acquiescence “does not necessarily
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