- 38 -
a statutory condition to obtaining the claimed
deduction. As we see it, what petitioners are seeking
is not the application of the substantial compliance
principle but an exemption from the clear requirement
of the statute and regulations in a situation where
there is no overvaluation of the charitable
contribution. We are not prepared to follow that path
to decision. [Hewitt v. Commissioner, supra at 264-266].
Petitioners also rely on Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32
(1993). In particular, they contend that in Bond this Court:
determined that the substantiation rules of DEFRA
section 155 and the Treasury Regulations thereunder are
directory rather than mandatory. As such, the Tax
Court does not require that taxpayers fully and
absolutely comply with the substantiation requirements
of the regulations in order to qualify for a charitable
contribution deduction. In Bond, the Tax Court used a
“substantial compliance” analysis to determine that a
taxpayer, who failed to meet the substantiation
requirements of DEFRA section 155 and the regulations,
nevertheless, was entitled to a charitable deduction
for a non-cash contribution.
Petitioners go on to attempt to equate the concept of
“substantial compliance” with the concept of “reasonable cause”.
Petitioners contend that
Although not specifically mentioning reasonable cause,
the decision of the Tax Court in Bond is a clear
reflection of the principal that [exceptions exist] to
the heightened substantiation reporting requirements
such as substantial compliance and reasonable cause.
We note that for charitable contributions made after June 3,
2004, Congress, in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA),
Pub. L. 108-357, sec. 883, 118 Stat. 1631, which added
section 170(f)(11), specifically codified the substantiation
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