Edward H. Jones, III - Page 20




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          Krogue told him appears to correctly describe the IRS’s policy in           
          such matters.  As best we can tell from petitioner’s memorandum,            
          the gravamen of petitioner’s claim is that--                                
               if she [Krogue] had determined that I had the assets to                
               pay the tax in full, was it not her duty to demand                     
               payment in full at that time?  With the fact that my                   
               ability to pay was clearly eroding throughout the time                 
               in which Ms. Krogue was assigned to my case (due to a                  
               decline in the value of my investment portfolio), why                  
               was Ms. Krogue unable to determine I had the ability to                
               pay in (or before) November, 2001, yet able to                         
               determine I could in April, 2002, when I clearly had                   
               less ability to pay?                                                   
               As it developed, the IRS and petitioner ultimately did agree           
          on an installment arrangement, although it was far less generous            
          than that which petitioner proposed.  Thus, the matter was not              
          open and shut, as petitioner seems to contend.  Krogue described            
          the basic ground rules to petitioner and proceeded to gather                
          information helpful to a determination on this matter.                      
               Viewing the record most favorably to petitioner, we conclude           
          that Krogue’s actions were neither erroneous nor dilatory in                
          performing a ministerial or managerial act during the first                 
          period.  We shall grant respondent’s summary judgment motion with           
          respect to the first period.                                                
               (2)  Second Period (Dec. 14, 2001--Feb. 25, 2002)                      
               Petitioner and Krogue back-and-forthed telephone calls. On             
          one of these telephone calls Krogue explained to petitioner what            
          matters had been keeping her from attending to petitioner’s case.           
          On February 26, 2002, Krogue examined the material petitioner had           






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