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Thomas, J., dissenting
with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325-326 (1937)." Salerno, supra, at 746. The legislative scheme the Court invalidates today is, at the very least, substantively reasonable. With all due respect, I do not remotely think it can be said that the laws in question "offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934). Therefore, in my view, this Court is not entitled, as a matter of substantive due process, to strike them down.
I respectfully dissent.
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