Cite as: 504 U. S. 71 (1992)
Opinion of the Court
We held, however, that "[t]he committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous," id., at 368; i. e., the acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer. We relied on O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), which held as a matter of due process that it was unconstitutional for a State to continue to confine a harmless, mentally ill person. Even if the initial commitment was permissible, "it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed." Id., at 575. In the summary of our holdings in our opinion we stated that "the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgand Justice Kennedy reject: that the period of time during which an insanity acquittee may be held in a mental institution is not measured by the length of a sentence that might have been imposed had he been convicted; rather, the acquittee may be held until he is either not mentally ill or not dangerous. Both Justices would permit the indefinite detention of the acquittee, although the State concedes that he is not mentally ill and although the doctors at the mental institution recommend his release, for no reason other than that a psychiatrist hesitates to certify that the acquittee would not be dangerous to himself or others.
Justice Kennedy asserts that we should not entertain the proposition that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity differs from a conviction. Post, at 94. Jones, however, involved a case where the accused had been "found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act." 463 U. S., at 364. We did not find this sufficient to negate any difference between a conviction and an insanity acquittal. Rather, we observed that a person convicted of crime may of course be punished. But "[d]ifferent considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished." Id., at 369.
Justice Kennedy observes that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of a criminal act permits a State to incarcerate and hold the offender on any reasonable basis. There is no doubt that the States have wide discretion in determining punishment for convicted offenders, but the Eighth Amendment ensures that discretion is not unlimited. The Justice cites no authority, but surely would have if it existed, for the proposition that a defendant convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of years may nevertheless be held indefinitely because of the likelihood that he will commit other crimes.
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