Cite as: 504 U. S. 255 (1992)
Thomas, J., dissenting
the statute, we noted with disapproval, would "leav[e] its outer boundaries ambiguous and involv[e] the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials." 7 Cf. Baxter, Federal Dis-7 Prior to our decision in McNally, the Government's theory had been accepted by every Court of Appeals to consider the issue. We did not consider that acceptance to cure the ambiguity we perceived in the statutory language; we simply reiterated the traditional learning that a federal criminal statute, particularly as applied to state officials, must be construed narrowly. See 483 U. S., at 359-360. "If Congress desires to go further," we said, "it must speak more clearly than it has." Id., at 360.
The dissent in McNally argued strenuously that the Court's interpretation of the statute should be informed by the majority view among the Courts of Appeals and Congress' subsequent silence:
"Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court's action today is its casual—almost summary—rejection of the accumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the question these cases present. . . . I [can]not join a rejection of such a longstanding, consistent interpretation of a federal statute. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U. S. 89, 101 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U. S. 27, 40 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Runyon v. Mc-Crary, 427 U. S. 160, 189 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)." Id., at 376- 377 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
The interpretation given a statute by a majority of the Courts of Appeals, of course, is due our most respectful consideration. Ultimately, however, our attention must focus on the reasons given for that interpretation. Error is not cured by repetition, and we do not discharge our duty simply by counting up the circuits on either side of the split. Here, the minority position of the Second and Ninth Circuits (both en banc) is far more thoughtfully reasoned than the position of the majority of Circuits, which have followed the Third Circuit's lead in United States v. Kenny, 462 F. 2d 1205 (1972), "without setting forth a reasoned elaboration for their conclusions." United States v. Cerilli, 603 F. 2d 415, 427, and n. 5 (CA3 1979) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Moreover, I reject the notion—as this Court has on many occasions— that Congress, through its silence, implicitly ratifies judicial decisions. See, e. g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 175, n. 1 (1989) ("It is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional ap-
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