280
Opinion of the Court
issue was briefed, albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the first oral argument in this case." Post, at 291 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). To the contrary, neither party initiated even the slightest suggestion that the "hindrance" question was an issue to be argued and decided here.11 That possibility was suggested for the first time by questions from the bench during argument, and was reintroduced, again from the bench, during reargument. (Respondents sought to include a "hindrance"-clause section in their Supplemental Brief on Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that section for filing. See 505 U. S. 1240 (1992).) In sum, the Justices reaching the "hindrance"-clause issue in this case must find in the complaint claims that the respondents themselves have admitted are not there; must resolve a question not presented to, or ruled on by, any lower court; must revise the rule that it is the petition for certiorari (not the brief in opposition and later briefs) that determines the questions presented; and must penalize the parties for not addressing an issue on
raises the "hindrance" claim. And there is no support whatever for Justice Souter's reliance upon the formulation of the question in respondents' brief on the merits, post, at 290, as the basis for deeming the question properly presented—though on the merits, once again, the question referred to by Justice Souter is unhelpful.
11 Respondents' brief asserted that, if the Court did not affirm the judgment on the basis of the "deprivation" clause, then a remand would be necessary, so that respondents could "present a number of contentions respecting [their right-to-privacy] claim" which had not been reached below, including the contention that "petitioners, by means of their blockades, had hindered the police in securing to women their right to privacy." Brief for Respondents 43. Petitioners' reply brief responded that the complaint did not contain such a "hindrance" claim, and that there was "no reason to believe" that the "hindrance" clause "would not entail the same statutory requirements of animus and independent rights which respondents have failed to satisfy under the first clause of the statute." Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15. These were obviously not arguments for resolution of the "hindrance" claim here.
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