Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 24 (1993)

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286

BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC

Opinion of the Court

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Justice Stevens' dissent observes that this is "a case about the exercise of federal power to control an interstate conspiracy to commit illegal acts," post, at 344, and involves "no ordinary trespass," or "picketing of a local retailer," but "the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871 and gave it its name," post, at 313. Those are certainly evocative assertions, but as far as the point of law we have been asked to decide is concerned, they are irrelevant. We construe the statute, not the views of "most members of the citizenry." Post, at 344. By its terms, § 1985(3) covers concerted action by as few as two persons, and does not require even interstate (much less nationwide) scope. It applies no more and no less to completely local action by two part-time protesters than to nationwide action by a full-time force of thousands.17 And under our precedents it simply does not apply to the sort of action at issue here.

Trespassing upon private property is unlawful in all States, as is, in many States and localities, intentionally obstructing the entrance to private premises. These offenses may be prosecuted criminally under state law, and may also be the basis for state civil damages. They do not, however, give rise to a federal cause of action simply because their objective is to prevent the performance of abortions, any more than they do so (as we have held) when their objective is to stifle free speech.

17 Justice Stevens chides us for invoking text here, whereas (he says) we rely instead upon "statutory purpose" for our class-based animus requirement—"selectively employ[ing] both approaches to give [§ 1985(3)] its narrowest possible construction." Post, at 343, n. 37. That is not so. For our class-based animus requirement we rely, plainly and simply, upon our holding in Griffin, whatever approach Griffin may have used. That holding is (though Justice Stevens might wish otherwise) an integral part of our jurisprudence extending § 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies.

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