Cite as: 507 U. S. 258 (1993)
Syllabus
recoupment. See United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 71. Pp. 263-265. (c) Nothing in the ICA provides that, in a carrier's undercharge collection action, a § 11705(b)(3) counterclaim is not subject to the normally applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 54(b). That Rule permits a district court to enter separate final judgment on any claim or counterclaim after making "an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." The "filed rate doctrine"—which embodies the principle that a shipper cannot avoid paying the tariff rate by invoking common-law claims and defenses— does not preclude avoidance of the tariff rate through claims and defenses that are specifically accorded by the ICA itself. Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U. S. 631, distinguished. Pp. 265-267. 2. Respondents' arguments that petitioners' counterclaims are not yet cognizable in court are rejected. Pp. 267-270. (a) The contention that paying the tariff rate is a prerequisite for litigating the reasonableness issue finds no support in the ICA. Rather, the ICA provides that a claim related to shipment of property accrues on delivery or tender of delivery, § 11706(g). Pp. 267-268. (b) Nor are petitioners required initially to present their claims to the ICC. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires only that a court enable "referral" to an administrative agency of a claim containing an issue within the agency's special competence, but does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. And the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies—which would deprive the court of jurisdiction—is inapplicable here, both because the ICC has long interpreted the ICA as giving it no power to decree reparations itself, and because the Court can discern within the ICA no intent that ICC determination of the reasonable-rate issue must be obtained before filing the civil action. Pp. 268-270. 3. The courts below made no "express determination" required under Rule 54(b) for entry of a separate judgment on respondents' claims, and it cannot be said categorically that it would be an abuse of discretion either to grant or to deny such judgment. Although insolvency of the claimant is a factor weighing against separate judgment in that claimant's favor, this Court cannot say that insolvency is an absolute bar. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U. S. 1, followed. Pp. 270-271. 949 F. 2d 107, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., dissented.
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