Cite as: 507 U. S. 258 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
v. Bonner Properties, Inc., 677 F. 2d 200, 203 (CA2 1982); Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 312 F. 2d 545, 549, n. 3 (CA2 1963).
One major consequence does attach to the fact that an unreasonable-rate claim is technically a counterclaim rather than a defense: A defense cannot possibly be adjudicated separately from the plaintiff's claim to which it applies; a counterclaim can be. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits a district court to enter separate final judgment on any claim or counterclaim, after making "an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427 (1956); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U. S. 445 (1956). This power is largely discretionary, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U. S. 1, 10 (1980), to be exercised in light of "judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved," id., at 8, and giving due weight to " 'the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals,' " ibid. (quoting Sears, supra, at 438).2
Nothing in the ICA provides that, in an action by a carrier to collect undercharges, a § 11705(b)(3) counterclaim is not subject to the normally applicable provisions of the Federal Rules. Respondents contend that the so-called "filed rate doctrine" gives them absolute entitlement to judgment on their undercharge claims, without defense or counterclaim.
2 For purposes of applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing counterclaims, it does not matter that this action arose in bankruptcy. Rules 8 and 54 are made fully applicable in adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rules 7008 and 7054, and Rule 13 is made applicable with only minor variation (not relevant here) by Bankruptcy Rule 7013. It is well settled, moreover, that a bankruptcy defendant can meet a plaintiff-debtor's claim with a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction, at least to the extent that the defendant merely seeks recoupment. See In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F. 2d 155, 157 (CA10 1986); Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F. 2d 870, 875 (CA3 1984). Recoupment permits a determination of the "just and proper liability on the main issue," and involves "no element of preference." 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 553.03, p. 553-17 (15th ed. 1991).
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