518
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
gress would have found our straightforward interpretation and application of its words either absurd or illogical.12 If
the consequences of that interpretation had been—or prove to be—as unjust as respondents contend, we are confident that Congress would have corrected the injustice—or will do so in the future.
The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
The Court begins its analysis with the observation: "The statutory command in § 525 is unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited." Ante, at 514. In my view, discussion of that point is where the remainder of the analysis should have ended. Instead, however, the Court feels compelled to demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history, including some dating back to 1917—a full quarter century
12 In his 11-page opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia suggests that our response to respondents' reliance on legislative history "is not merely a waste of research time and ink," but also "a false and disruptive lesson in the law." Post, at 519. His "hapless law clerk," post, at 527, has found a good deal of evidence in the legislative history that many provisions of this statute were intended to confer discretion on trial judges. That, of course, is precisely our point: It is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to authorize such discretion when it expressly provided for it and to deny such discretion when it did not. A jurisprudence that confines a court's inquiry to the "law as it is passed," and is wholly unconcerned about "the intentions of legislators," post, at 519, would enforce an unambiguous statutory text even when it produces manifestly unintended and profoundly unwise consequences. Respondents have argued that this is such a case. We disagree. Justice Scalia, however, is apparently willing to assume that this is such a case, but would nevertheless conclude that we have a duty to enforce the statute as written even if fully convinced that every Member of the enacting Congress, as well as the President who signed the Act, intended a different result. Again, we disagree. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 610, n. 4 (1991).
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