Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 14 (1993)

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524

CONROY v. ANISKOFF

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

scribed, can be considered discretionary rather than rigid. The existence of discretionary authority to suspend the tolling is also suggested by the House floor debates. Responding to questions, Representative Sparkman (who submitted the Report on behalf of the House Committee on Military Affairs) agreed that, while the bill "pertains to all persons in the armed forces," a man "serving in the armed forces for more money than he got in civil life . . . is not entitled to any of the benefits of the provisions of this bill." 88 Cong. Rec. 5364, 5365 (1942). In response to that last comment, another Representative inquired further whether "[t]his is to take care of the men who are handicapped because of their military service." Id., at 5365. Representative Sparkman answered affirmatively. Ibid. He confirmed that Congress did not intend to abandon the discretionary nature of the scheme: "With reference to all these matters we have tried to make the law flexible by lodging discretion within the courts to do or not to do as justice and equity may require." Ibid. And finally, at a later point in the debates, Representative Brooks made clear that the Act was intended to remedy the prejudice resulting from compelled military service: "We feel that the normal obligations of the man contracted prior to service induction should be suspended as far as practicable during this tour of duty, and that the soldier should be protected from default in his obligations due to his inability to pay caused by reduction in income due to service." Id., at 5369.

The final component of the legislative history that I shall treat is the extension of the 1940 Act in the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604. The Court misconstrues Congress's intent in this enactment in two respects. First, it asserts that "because Congress extended the life of the Act indefinitely in 1948, well after the end of World War II, the complete legislative history confirms a congressional intent to protect all military personnel on active duty, just as the statutory language provides." Ante, at 515 (footnote omit-

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