Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 11 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 511 (1993)

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

it serve the same vital purpose—providing "protection against suit to men in military service"—as various state statutes had served during the Civil War. 1917 House Report 3; see also id., at 18-32 (App. A) (setting forth text of numerous state soldiers' relief Acts from the Civil War era). Congress intended, however, that the 1918 Act should differ from the Civil War statutes "in two material respects." 55 Cong. Rec. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep. Webb). The first was that, being a national statute, it would produce a disposition "uniform throughout the Nation." 1917 House Report 3; see also 55 Cong. Rec. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep. Webb). But it is the second difference which has particular relevance to the Court's ruling today:

"The next material difference between this law and the various State laws is this, and in this I think you will find the chief excellence of the bill which we propose: Instead of the bill we are now considering being arbitrary, inelastic, inflexible, the discretion as to dealing out even-handed justice between the creditor and the soldier, taking into consideration the fact that the soldier has been called to his country's cause, rests largely, and in some cases entirely, in the breast of the judge who tries the case." Id., at 7787 (statement of Rep. Webb).3

This comment cannot be dismissed as the passing remark of an insignificant Member, since the speaker was the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, the committee that re-pension of disbelief—that two-thirds of the Members of both Houses of Congress (or a majority plus the President) were aware of those statements and must have agreed with them; or perhaps it is to be assumed— by a sort of suspension of the Constitution—that Congress delegated to that personage or personages the authority to say what its laws mean.

3 In quoting this floor statement, I follow the convention of legislative history, which is to assume conclusively that statements recorded in the Congressional Record were in fact made. That assumption of course does not accord with reality. See 117 Cong. Rec. 36506-36507 (1971) (supposed floor statement shown by internal evidence never to have been delivered).

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