530
Opinion of the Court
ity—reinforces this reading of its plain language. Texas' proposed reading, however, would give delinquent States less incentive to pay their debts. Neither the fact that the Food Stamp Act has a mechanism to collect debts nor the fact that Congress did not see the States as the root of the debt collection problem when it passed the Debt Collection Act indicates that Congress meant to relieve the States of their common-law obligation. Texas incorrectly argues that the reimbursement requirement is not subject to prejudgment interest because it is a penalty rather than a contractual obligation. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U. S. 371, 374-376, distinguished. Pp. 534-539. 951 F. 2d 645, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 539.
Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, William Kanter, and Bruce G. Forrest.
James C. Todd argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, Edwin N. Horne and Christopher Johnsen, Assistant Attorneys General, and Jorge Vega.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we decide the question left open in West Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S. 305, 312-313, n. 5 (1987): whether Congress intended the Debt Collection Act of 1982 to abrogate the United States' federal common-law right to collect prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the States. We hold that it did not.
Texas incurred the instant debts as a result of participation in the Food Stamp Program, 78 Stat. 703, as amended,
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