United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 12 (1993)

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540

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

Stevens, J., dissenting

The presumption that a sovereign State is "always ready to pay what it owes" 4 may well have been just as fictional as the presumption that the King could do no wrong, but it nevertheless was firmly embedded in the common law.5 Moreover, even today the tradition of according special respect to a sovereign State whenever it is subjected to the coercive powers of judicial tribunals is very much alive. See, e. g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 146 (1993). The ancient common-law presumption and a continuing recognition of "the importance of ensuring that the State's dignitary interests can be fully vindicated," ibid., best explain why Congress deliberately omitted any provision for the collection of interest from a sovereign State when it enacted the Debt Collection Act in 1982.6

The Court is also correct in noting that we are reluctant to infer a legislative abrogation of the common law. Ante, at 534. We presume that Congress understands the legal terrain in which it operates, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699 (1979), and we therefore

amount recovered. It accrues only after the recovery has been had. Moreover, whenever interest is allowed either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. But delay or default cannot be attributed to the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it owes." United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 567-568 (1879) (emphasis added). See also United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 336 (1920).

4 See n. 3, supra.

5 See, e. g., Attorney General v. Cape Fear Navigation Co., 37 N. C. 444, 454 (1843) ("[T]he general rule is, that the State never pays interest, unless she expressly engages to do so"); State v. Thompson, 10 Ark. 61 (1849).

6 Title 31 U. S. C. § 3717(a) requires the appropriate government official to charge interest "on an outstanding debt on a United States Government claim owed by a person," but 31 U. S. C. § 3701(c) provides that for purposes of this section the term " 'person' does not include an agency of the United States Government, of a State government, or of a unit of general local government."

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