Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 41 (1993)

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Cite as: 509 U. S. 43 (1993)

Stevens, J., dissenting

Justice O'Connor is in my determination that extensions of the application period in this case were entirely consistent with legislative intent, and hence well within the authority of the District Courts.

It is no doubt true that "[w]hen Congress passes a benefits statute that includes a time period, it has two goals." See ante, at 76 (opinion concurring in judgment). Here, Congress' two goals were finality in its one-time amnesty program, and the integration of productive aliens into the American mainstream. See Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F. 2d 798, 813 (CA2 1992). To balance both ends, and to achieve each, Congress settled on a 12-month application period. Twelve months, Congress determined, would be long enough for frightened aliens to come to understand the program and to step forward with applications, especially when the full period was combined with the special outreach efforts mandated by the Reform Act. Ibid.; see 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(i) (requiring broad dissemination of information about amnesty program); § 1255a(c)(2) (establishing QDE's). The generous 12-month period would also serve the goal of finality, by " 'ensur[ing] true resolution of the problem and . . . that the program will be a one-time-only program.' " 967 F. 2d, at 813 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 72.

The problem, of course, is that the full 12-month period was never made available to respondents. For the CSS class, the 12-month period shrank to precisely 12 days during which they were eligible for legalization; for the LULAC class, to roughly 5 months. See supra, at 77. Accordingly, congressional intent required an extension of the filing deadline, in order to make effective the 12-month application period critical to the balance struck by Congress. See 956 F. 2d, at 922; Perales, 967 F. 2d, at 813.

That congressional intent is furthered, not frustrated, by

the equitable relief granted here distinguishes this case from Pangilinan, in which we held that a court lacked the authority to order naturalization for certain persons after expira-

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