Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 42 (1993)

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84

RENO v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC.

Stevens, J., dissenting

tion of a statutory deadline. 486 U. S., at 882-885. In Pangilinan, we were faced with a "congressional command [that] could not be more manifest" specifically precluding the relief granted. Id., at 884. The Reform Act, on the other hand, contains no such explicit limitation.5 Indeed, the Reform Act does not itself contain a statutory deadline at all, leaving it largely to the Attorney General to delineate a 12-month period. 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A). This delegation highlights the relative insignificance to Congress of the application cutoff date, as opposed to the length of the application period itself. See Perales, 967 F. 2d, at 813, n. 4.

Finally, I can see no reason to limit otherwise available relief to those class members who experienced "front-desking," on the theory that they have "applied" for legalization. Cf. ante, at 67, n. 29; ante, at 76-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). It makes no sense to condition relief on the filing of a futile application. Indeed, we have already rejected the proposition that such an application is necessary for receipt of an equitable remedy. In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), a case involving discriminatory employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we held that those who had been deterred from applying for jobs by an employer's practice of rejecting applicants like themselves were eligible for relief along with those who had unsuccessfully applied. We reasoned:

"A consistently enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection.

5 There is no language in the Reform Act prohibiting an extension of the application period. Section 1255a(f)(2), relied on by the Government, see Brief for Petitioners 28-29, precludes review of individual late-filed applications; like § 1255a(f)(1), it has no bearing on the kind of broad-based challenge and remedy at issue here. See ante, at 55, and n. 17; ante, at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

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