Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 47 (1994)

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312

ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER

Stevens, J., dissenting

This conclusion should end our inquiry. Whether the Due Process Clause in any given case may provide a "duplication of protections," ante, at 287 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) is irrelevant to whether a liberty interest is at stake.29

Even assuming the dubious proposition that, in this case, due process protection against a baseless prosecution may not provide "a substantial increment to protection otherwise available," ibid.,30 that is a consideration relevant only to damages, not to the existence of constitutional protection. Furthermore, that few of petitioner's injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does not make those injuries insubstantial. To the contrary, I can think of few powers that the State possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, can harm liberty as substantially as the filing of criminal charges.

29 Justice Souter relies in part upon "pragmatic concerns about subjecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct." Ante, at 287. I see no basis for that concern in this case. Moreover, Congress properly weighs "pragmatic concerns" when it decides whether to provide a remedy for a violation of federal law. Such concerns motivated the enactment of § 1983—a statute that provides a remedy for constitutional violations. Thus, if such a violation is alleged— and I am satisfied that one is here—we have a duty to enforce the statute without examining pragmatic concerns.

30 It seems to me quite wrong to attribute to a subsequent arrest the reputational and other harms caused by an unjustified accusation. In addition, although Justice Ginsburg is prepared to hold that a Fourth Amendment claim does not accrue until the baseless charges are dismissed, at least some of the Courts of Appeals have held that the arrest triggers the running of the statute of limitations. See, e. g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 331, 351 (CA3 1989); McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F. 2d 903, 906 (CA6 1988); Mack v. Varelas, 835 F. 2d 995, 1000 (CA2 1987); Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F. 2d 1144, 1146 (CA9 1983). And, given the disposition of this case, a majority of this Court might agree. In any event, uncertainties about such matters counsel against constitutional adjudication based upon "pragmatic concerns."

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