Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
VIII
While the supposed adequacy of an alternative federal remedy persuades Justices Ginsburg and Souter that petitioner's claim fails, the availability of an alternative state remedy convinces Justice Kennedy. I must therefore explain why I do not agree with his reliance on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). In 1975, I helped plant the seed that ultimately flowered into the Parratt doctrine. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1318-1319 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978) (cited in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 541-542). The plaintiff in Bonner, like the plaintiff in Parratt, claimed that the negligence of state agents had deprived him of a property interest "without due process of law." In both cases, the claim was rejected because a predeprivation remedy was infeasible and the State's postdeprivation remedy was considered adequate to prevent a constitutional violation. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 543-544; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1319-1320. Both of those cases involved the type of ordinary common-law tort that can be committed by anyone. Such torts are not deprivations "without due process" simply because the tortfeasor is a public official.
The rationale of those cases is inapplicable to this case whether one views the claim at issue as substantive or procedural.31 If one views the petitioner's claim as one of substantive due process, Parratt is categorically inapplicable. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125 (1990). Conversely, if one views his claim as one of procedural due process, Parratt is also inapplicable, because its rationale does not apply to officially authorized deprivations of liberty or property.
31 See 1 S. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983, § 3.15, pp. 211-212 (3d ed. 1991).
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