374
Thomas, J., dissenting
ment would fail. We have already found the challenged fees reasonable under the AHTA through the lens of Evansville—that is, under a reasonableness standard taken directly from our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
* * *
For the reasons stated, and without prejudging the outcome of any eventual proceeding before or regulation by the Secretary of Transportation, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
Today the Court transforms a statutory prohibition on a narrow class of charges on air travel into a broad mandate for federal regulation and review of virtually all airport fees. I disagree with the Court that the landing fees, rental charges, and carrying charges challenged here fall within the scope of the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA or Act), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513. Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the Act imposes a "reasonableness" requirement on all airport charges and user fees. Instead, the Act merely prohibits fees, taxes, and charges imposed on the bases specified in § 1513(a), and leaves airports free to impose other charges, subject to the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause. Because the Act does not apply to the fees at issue in this case, I would remand for consideration of petitioners' Commerce Clause claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 362-363, Congress passed the AHTA in response to this Court's decision in
courts would invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional action.").
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