370
Opinion of the Court
The District Court found that (with one minor exception 16)
the Airport charged the Airlines "the break-even costs for the areas they use." 738 F. Supp., at 1119.17 In this light,
we cannot conclude that the Airlines were charged fees "excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred." Evansville, supra, at 717. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25 ("As long as an airport's charges to air carriers do not result in revenues that exceed by more than a reasonable margin the costs of servicing those carriers, the Secretary would normally sustain those charges as reasonable under federal law.") (citing Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Compliance Requirements, Order No. 5190.6A §§ 4-13, 4-14, pp. 20-22 (Oct. 2, 1989), and 14 CFR § 399.110(f) (1993)).
2
The Airlines also contend that the Airport's fee methodology is unlawful because, by imposing on the Airlines virtu-Inc., 712 F. Supp. 834, 838, 839 (Colo. 1989) (rejecting a similar argument, noting: "Nothing in the history and purpose of the Anti-Head Tax Act indicates that Congress intended the courts to act as a public utility commission and intervene in the setting of airport rates and charges through the adoption or rejection of any particular type of cost accounting methodology. Denver's division of costs and revenues between airlines and concessionaires is facially a reasonable approach to establishing rental charges, terminal rates, landing fees and other service charges which are collected from the users of the facilities at Stapleton [Airport].").
16 The District Court found that the Airport overcharged the Airlines for aircraft parking and ordered the Airport "to recalculate this fee to result in a true break-even charge." 738 F. Supp., at 1120. The Airport did not appeal this order.
17 The Airlines do not dispute that they are charged only their allocated share of the airfield and terminal costs. They assert, however, that the Airport has allocated to them excessive "carrying charges" or amortization fees for capital improvements. The Court of Appeals specifically addressed and rejected this contention, concluding that the rate charged "is reasonable and should not result in a net present value which exceeds the initial cost of the [capital improvements] project." 955 F. 2d 1054, 1063 (CA6 1992). We have no cause to disturb that determination.
Page: Index Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007